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Abstract: Within Indonesian contemporary political discourse, 
fundamentalist groups are implementing a linguistic 
manipulation of Arabic terminology in order to influence the 
thinking of wider public. Prolific use of Arabic terminology in 
religious and political discourse is employed by such groups to 
baffle the thinking of impressionable audience. This study 
examines the use of Arabic terms by two Islamist groups in 
Indonesia, namely the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela 
Islam/FPI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). It uses in-
depth interviews with leaders of those organizations combined 
with a critical discourse analysis approach. It examines the use 
of three key Arabic terms—‘jihad’ ‘khilafah’  and ‘habib’—to 
illustrate how the meaning of those words has been distorted 
compared with their generally accepted Indonesian definitions. 
The paper theorizes that this practice conforms to Gramscian 
notions of cultural hegemony, that a ruling elite manufactures 
the consent, loyalty and discipline of a mass of followers to 
uncritically conform to the preferred thought of the hegemony.  
Keywords: Arabic terminology, political communication, 
cultural hegemony, fundamentalist groups. 
Introduction 
While estimates of the number of participants in Jakarta’s ‘Aksi 
Bela Islam 212 ’(Action to Defend Islam 212) vary (from less than one 
million to 7.5 million), “what most people can agree on is that it was 
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has ever seen”.1 While the action brought together a coalition of 
disparate Islamic groups, it was spearheaded by conservative Islamists 
such as the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam or ‘FPI’) who 
were demanding the imprisonment of the Jakarta Governor Basuki 
Tjahaya Purnama (popularly known as ‘Ahok’), on charges of 
blasphemy. The movement which achieved the goal of imprisoning 
Ahok is demonstrative of a “kebangkitan Islam” (Islamic reawakening) 
which is gaining mass support, not only from groups which were 
previously considered to be fringe such as FPI (previously known for 
their ‘sweeping ’operations, and attacks against Ahmadiyah minorities 
which earned them the epithet of ‘gangsters in robes’ but also 
mainstream Islamic organisations and leaders.2 Anies Baswedan the 
gubernatorial candidate supported by the action, later went on to win 
the election and became Governor of Jakarta. Baswedan appeared on 
stage at the one-year “reunion” of the 212 action in December, 2017.  
The paper seeks to explore one avenue by which former fringe 
groups such as FPI have been able to gain influence in mainstream 
politics, and the widespread support of the public. Forming political 
alliances with powerful leaders is clearly one tactic.3 Another tactic is 
through the strategic use of Arabic phraseology and linguistic 
manipulation of the meanings of Arabic terms. It seeks to answer the 
following question: how do Islamist groups in Indonesia, particularly 
the FPI and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), interpret and use Arabic 
terminology, for their own interests, to gain political influence.  
This paper begins by discussing the links between language and 
hegemonic political power, with particular reference to Indonesia. It 
then particularly examines the use of Arabic terms by two Islamist 
groups in Indonesia, namely the FPI and HTI. It employs in-depth 
interviews with leaders of those organisations combined with direct 
observations in the field, and uses a critical discourse analysis 
                                                                
1 “Reflections on a Reunion in Jakarta - New Mandala,” accessed May 11, 2019, 
https://www.newmandala.org/reflections-reunion/. 
2 “A Kinder, More Gentle FPI? - Inside Indonesia,” accessed May 11, 2020, 
https://www.insideindonesia.org/a-kinder-more-gentle-fpi. 
3 Liam Gammon, “Is Populism a Threat to Indonesian Democracy?,” in Democracy in 
Indonesia: Stagnation in Regression?, ed. Thomas Power and Eve Warburton (Singapore: 
ISEAS Publishing, 2020), 101. 
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approach. It examines the use of three key Arabic terms—‘jihad ’ ‘ habib’ 
and ‘khilafah’—to illustrate how the meanings of those words have 
been distorted compared with the generally accepted Indonesian 
definitions to eliminate nuance and to influence thought so as to fall in 
line with the groups’ interpretations and ideology. 
This study uses a qualitative approach with a critical-constructivist 
paradigm; with critical discourse analysis (CDA) method as 
conceptualised by Norman Fairclough. Fairclough developed a three-
dimensional method for analysing discourse which focusses on; text, 
discourse practice, and social practice. In this paper the texts analysed 
are three Arabic words: jihad, khilafah, and habib. 4 The reason for 
choosing these words is because the usage of the words is becoming 
more frequent, both in everyday communication, either through the 
media or other channels. In discourse practice we interviewed key 
figures from FPI and HTI. The reason for choosing these two groups 
is based on their success in developing the organizations and gaining 
extensive media exposure from a number of mass media outlets.  
Fairclough’s CDA has three dimensions of data analysis, namely: 
text, text’s production (discourse practice) and social context (socio-
cultural practice). The data used in this research based on these 
dimensions are: (1) Text: The definition of ‘Jihad’, ‘Khilafah’ and 
‘Habib’ in the KBBI – Indonesia’s most authoritative dictionary; (2) 
Discourse practice: the meaning of the texts and the productions of 
the texts by the institutions, based on in-depth interview results from 
key figures in the FPI and HTI; (3) Socio-cultural practice: The social 
context of those words in society (news reports for example).5 
Indonesia and Language 
Indonesia has more than 700 local languages. However, Bahasa 
Malayu, the lingua franca of trade in the region was chosen as the 
unifying national language, and became Bahasa Indonesia. The 
                                                                
4 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, The Critical Study of Language (New 
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language has clear influences from a number of foreign sources 
including Portuguese, Dutch, English and Arabic among others.6   
Change and evolution in the meaning of words is common in 
every language and society; especially in a large and culturally diverse 
country such as Indonesia. Arabic language has long been used in 
Indonesia as a language of instruction in religious schools (pesantren). 
Arabic script has also been used for writing the Malay language (Jawi). 
It is not unusual therefore that some Arabic terminology has entered 
the Indonesian lexicon.  
However, this paper argues that there has been a shift in the use of 
Arabic language by particular groups, such as the FPI and HTI. 
Leading figures in such groups are using Arabic language more 
prolifically and fluently. The profuse usage of Arabic in speech, is 
intended to indicate that the user is ‘more Islamic’ which equates with 
greater moral purity and piety. This process attempts to conflate 
‘Arabic’ with ‘Islamic’, to reinforce religious dogma which may not be 
challenged or reinterpreted, and to apply Islamic teachings to regulate 
Indonesian society, nation and state. People who are more fluent in 
Arabic, are immediately assumed to have religious superiority by their 
target audiences of ordinary Indonesians.  
Jurgen Habermas in Communication and the Evolution of Society,7 posits 
that communication processes within a society will affect the evolution 
of the society itself. Javanese feudalis8 was reinforced by the linguistic 
structure. The highly structured Javanese language has several different 
levels, depending on the relative social status of the speaker and the 
listener. This differentiation of levels reinforces the segregation of class 
in Javanese culture through language. Bahasa Malayu was specifically 
chosen by Indonesia’s founding fathers because of its egalitarian 
nature. Anderson speaks of Indonesian as a language of “attack” 
against Dutch colonialism and that it had a “democratic feel...which 
aspired to egalitarian norms...nationalism was then still partly seen in 
                                                                
6 Karl Anderbeck, “Portraits of Language Vitality in the Languages of Indonesia,” in 
Language Documentation and Cultural Practices in the Austronesian World, ed. I Wayan Arka 
(Canberra: Asia-Pacific Linguistics, 2015), 19–47. 
7 Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Reason and Rationalization of Society 
(Boston: Beacon Press Book, 1984). 
8 Bennedict Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990). 
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terms of breaking out of ‘Javanism’ and the hierarchical modes of 
Javanese social intercourse”.9 As a cultural group, Javanese make up 
the majority of the population of Indonesia.  
Attempts to further embed Arabic terminology in Indonesian 
society will therefore contribute to a transformative process that 
conflates Arabic language with Islam; which embeds Islamic tenets 
into mainstream thinking and leaves little room for alternative 
interpretations or debate.  
Commenting on the deliberate use of esoteric and 
incomprehensible language in the indoctrination of young students in 
Indonesia’s pesantren to ‘manifest [the] power’ of the spiritual leader, or 
kyai, Anderson wrote:  
“The prestige of the kyai, rested on many factors, on his reputed 
ancestry, his powers, his experience, and his personal character—
but above all on his mastery of an esoteric vocabulary. The most 
important element in this vocabulary was, generally speaking, 
Arabic.  
The normal method of instruction of boys and youths in the 
pesantren was the inculcation, by rote, of extensive passages of 
the Koran...Arabic was maintained as the language of “initiation” 
precisely because Arabic was not understood; the whole point of a 
spiritual ritual in an uncomprehended language is that it manifests 
power, and implies a deliberately nonrationalist mode of 
cognition”.10  
A teaching style which applies ‘a deliberately non-rationalist mode 
of cognition’ is clearly not one which encourages independent, critical 
thought. The goal would seem to be in fact, the opposite—to switch 
off thought, to promote blind acceptance of the lessons, 
interpretations and thinking of the hegemon. The paper argues that the 
leaders of Islamist groups, some of whom are themselves the products 
of the pesantren educational system, are attempting to apply this same 
strategy to both their members, and to the wider public.  
Furthermore, the meaning behind Arabic terminology is 
increasingly pointed to by Islamist groups such as the FPI and HTI. 
This paper follows the classification of ‘fundamentalist Islamic’ groups 
                                                                
9 Ibid., 139. 
10 Ibid., 127. 
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set out by Mubarak.11 The term ‘Islamist’ is used to refer to groups 
and individuals that see the world primarily through the prism of 
Islamic teaching and seek to structure the state and society in 
accordance with Islamic principles.12 That is, that Islam is a complete 
ideology which must be applied in all aspects of civil and political life. 
That Islam ought to form the basis of the nation-state, and Islamic 
tenets ought to govern all aspects of social interactions. Islamic law 
should also form the basis of the legal system, including Islamic 
corporal punishments (h }udu >d). Islamists view all social, political and 
legal interactions through the prism of Islam and believe that 
Indonesia should be converted into an Islamic state. Some groups 
differ as to whether they consider it acceptable to use violence in the 
achievement of these goals.13  
For the fundamentalist Islamic group, doctrine as found in the 
Qur’an and Hadith (Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad SAW) is a 
doctrine that is universal and has covered all aspects of human life. 
According to Mahendra, the doctrines as considered by 
fundamentalists are not limited by space and time, so they want to 
return to re-establish a society as they believe existed in the days of the 
Prophet and the Companions of the Prophet as an ideal age. 14 The 
characteristics of fundamentalist Islam in applying the verses in the 
Qur’an and Hadith is based on a literal interpretation which is closed 
to any further discussion.15 Literalist Islamists read Qur’anic text in a 
literal way which does not take into account historical, technological, 
contextual changes, and metaphorical or symbolic significance of 
parables. “Closed” here means that the interpretation becomes the 
totality (ka>ffah) that cannot be further debated and is not open to other 
                                                                
11 M. Zaki Mubarak, Genealogi Islam Radikal Di Indonesia, Gerakan, Pemikiran Dan Prospek 
Demokrasi (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2008). 
12 “Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia | Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute | ASPI,” accessed April 24, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/local-
jihad-radical-islam-and-terrorism-indonesia. 
13 Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism (Singapore: 
ISEAS Publishing, 2010). 
14 Muhammad Wahyuni Nafis, Rekonstruksi Dan Renungan Religius Islam (Jakarta: 
Paramadina, 1996). 
15 Abdurrahman Wahid, Ilusi Negara Islam, Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional Di 
Indonesia (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2009). 
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possibilities. Islamic fundamentalists do not understand the Qur’an as 
a collection of lessons learned (al-Furqa>n meaning ‘lesson learned’ is 
actually an alternative title for the Qur’an), but as a set of doctrines.  
Islamist groups such as FPI and HTI, through the prolific use of 
Arabic terminology in their religious activities such as sermons and 
religious study groups, are making religious views inseparable from the 
political sphere; therefore, transforming Arabic terminology into a 
form of political communication. The use of digital communication 
technology by these groups amplifies and accelerates the use of Arabic 
as a vehicle of political communication. If this continues, the 
perception of Indonesia in world politics will be coloured by the 
terminology used by Islamic fundamentalists. Moreover, while 
Muslims form the vast majority of Indonesia’s populace (about 229 
million)16 the majority remain silent against the rising hegemony of 
Islamic fundamentalists.  
Language, Political Communication and Cultural Hegemony 
Chilton wrote in detail about the relationship of language and 
politics; the process of interaction, as well as representation, including 
the use of language with a religious approach that is used in political 
communication.17 According to Chilton, political tradition suggests 
that there is a close relationship between language and politics at a very 
fundamental level.18 Any form of human activity can therefore be 
interpreted as political activity, and this could not be possible without 
the use of language itself. That is to say that political action is the 
action of the language itself.  
Meanwhile Nimmo posited that language in politics is a game with 
serious consequences; that those with finely honed rhetorical skills are 
those who gain power in democratic institutions.19 This phenomenon 
is reflected in the current situation whereby Islamist groups are gaining 
influence through the use Arabic language which is permeating into the 
general discourse of wider society.  
                                                                
16 Data taken from the World Population Review, https://worldpopulationreview.-
com/country-rankings/muslim-population-by-country.  
17 Paul Chilton, Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004). 
18 Ibid., 16. 
19 Dan Nimmo, Komunikasi Politik (Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2005). 
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The elimination of nuance, or shades of meaning, that are 
undesirable to the ruling party is reminiscent of Orwellian linguistic 
manipulation in the creation of a controlled language known as 
‘NewSpeak’ in George Orwell’s political portrayal of a dystopian, 
totalitarian future, in 1984. He wrote of NewSpeak that: 
“Its vocabulary was so constructed as to give exact and often very 
subtle expression to every meaning that a Party member could 
properly wish to express, while excluding all other meaning and 
also the possibility of arriving at them by indirect methods. This 
was done partly by the invention of new words, but chiefly by 
eliminating undesirable words and stripping such words as 
remained of unorthodox meanings, and so far as possible of all 
secondary meaning whatever”.20 
Gramsci developed three main supporting ideas in his overall 
concept of hegemony. First: the hegemony of the culture and moral 
leadership. In this concept he saw civil society as being oppressed by 
the state as the holder of power in the form of police and military, 
combined with economic and monetary control. The second concept 
of hegemony, is that the state controls civil society through educational 
institutions. While the third concept of hegemony, is that civil groups 
can contribute to hegemony of civil society through their own 
activities.  
According to Bocock, Gramsci sometimes defines the state as 
“political society” plus “civil society”. So that the civil groups can also 
act as a hegemonizing force on other groups in society which are 
considered weaker. Gramsci's Prison Notebooks also make reference 
to the importance of language in the process of hegemony.21 
Hegemonizing force may be exercised through influencing three core 
areas: 1. The language itself, that is the totality of the various concepts 
and ideas predefined and not just words; 2. Concepts of common 
sense and policies (good sense); 3. popular religion, and the whole 
system of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, how to look at various things 
and how to act, collectively united under the name ‘Folklore’. From 
understanding the above, it is clear that language on its own is just one 
                                                                
20 George Orwell, 1984 (New York: LeBook Publishing, 2020), 917. 
21 Robert Bocock, Pengantar Komperhensif Untuk Memahami Hegemoni (Yogyakarta: 
Penerbit Jalasutra, 2007). 
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means of exerting a hegemonic force on a society. Where one group is 
considered weak in its use of language and the other group is able to 
manipulate and control linguistic concepts, ideas and usage, this is 
where hegemony may occur.  
Manipulation of the Meaning of Terms: Jiha >d, Khila >fah and 
H}abi >b 
1. Term of Jiha>d 
Text 
In the Indonesian context, based on Kamus Besar Bahasa 
Indonesia (KBBI – Indonesia’s most authoritative dictionary), the 
word jihad is defined as follows: 
“Jiha>d n Isl 1. attempt by all means to achieve goodness; 2. earnest 
effort to defend Islam at the expense of property, soul, and body; 
3. holy war against unbelievers to defend Islam; - great war; the 
fight against lust (evil); - Fi> sabi>lilla>h jihad in the path of Allah, (for 
the progress of Islam or to defend the truth); jiha>d fought (in 
Allah's way); fight”.22 
Discourse Practice 
As can be seen from this definition, there are at least three 
different meanings which can be attributed to the word. Representing 
FPI, in an interview, Secretary General Sobri Lubis23 accepted two 
different meanings of the word jiha>d. First, jiha >d has the common sense 
meaning from the perspective of Arabic language derived from the 
word aj-juhd, meaning sincerity or earnestness. Whatever is done in 
earnest may therefore be characterised as jiha>d. Secondly, jiha>d has a 
special meaning that is, to fight, for those who have been authorized 
by God to fight, in the cause of Allah against Islam’s enemies, for 
example the heathen h}arbi (those hostile to Islam). This martial sense 
of jihad is also known as al-qita>l jiha>d fi > Sabi>lilla>h. Therefore, according 
to the FPI, as represented by its current leader, Sobri Lubis, it is not 
correct to refer to jihad only in the martial sense of participating in 
violent warfare. He said: 
                                                                
22 https://kbbi.kemdikbud.go.id/entri/jihad  
23 At the time of interview Sobri Lubis was the FPI Secretary General, however since 
2017 is the leader of the organisation.  
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“The two notions of jiha >d should be taught to the public. The 
special meaning of jiha>d, and the common meaning of jiha>d, both 
are part of Islam, there is no separation. As the Prophet SAW said 
“Tholabul H}ala>l Jiha>dun” “Making a living is jiha>d”. So making a 
living in a proper way is part of jihad. We cannot deny that. So to 
interpret jiha >d only in the sense of war alone, is denying the H }adi>th 
of the prophet”.24  
While the dual meaning is acknowledged by the FPI, it is also the 
case that jiha>d is often used as a justification for suicide attacks such as 
those which have occurred in Indonesia, notably Jakarta and Bali, on 
multiple occasions.25 Lubis responded by saying:  
“It depends on the way you view the attacks. From a global 
perspective, attacks against the evil Americans, who are 
considered criminals by many Muslims, are part of jiha>d. However, 
if we look at local attacks in Indonesia, many of the victims are in 
fact Muslims, even though they may not have been the intended 
targets. In this case, jiha>d causes victims for many different parties. 
And causes harm in particular to Muslims themselves”.26  
While it appears that the FPI reject the use of suicide bombings as 
a form of jiha>d, an attitude of ambivalence becomes evident in 
comments such as this from Lubis:  
“Yet we honour those who think, argue, globally. But from the 
FPI, we disagree. I have also held demonstrations, to reject 
bombings in the Republic of Indonesia in the name of jiha >d. Like 
the bombing at the Marriott hotel, it is not right. But if it is done 
somewhere else, in the enemy’s territory, not in Indonesia, it may 
be legitimate. But whatever they do, if they do it earnestly to 
destroy, to resist the infidel h}arbi, the USA, they will get their 
                                                                
24 Interview with Sobri Lubis, 2009. 
25 The terrorist attack in Bali on 12 October 2002 was the first case of a suicide 
terrorist attack in Indonesia, killing 202 people. Following that, suicide attacks have 
occurred in Jakarta on multiple occasions including, in 2006 (Australian Embassy), in 
2003 (Marriott Hotel), in 2005 (Bali), in 2009 (Ritz-Carlton and Marriott hotels) and 
most recently in January 2016, (Sarinah, Central Jakarta). Each of these attacks were 
attributed to Jihadist terrorist groups including Jemaah Islamiyah and splinter groups.  
26 Interview with Sobri Lubis, 2009. 
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reward, the reward of the muja >hidi>n (fighters), because it depends 
on their intention”.27 
The statement shows that under certain circumstances, violent 
suicide attacks are accepted as a legitimate part of jiha>d for the FPI 
leader, and hence members of the FPI organization. As Chusniyah has 
noted, the predominant understanding of most members of the FPI is 
that jiha>d is a form of justified "sacred violence" that is, a form of 
violence which is legitimated by certain verses of Al-Qur’an.28  
The interpretation of the term jiha>d by HTI is far less ambiguous. 
According to HTI as expressed by their spokesperson Ismail Yusanto, 
jiha>d is interpreted unequivocally as war, or qita>l. He said:  
“Hizbut Tahrir understands jihad as ‘qita >l al-kuffa>r fi> sabi>lillah lilla >hi 
ma >jidah’. That is, that jiha>d means ‘fighting the infidels’. Therefore 
qita >l is jiha>d”.29  
Yusanto was aware of alternative meanings of the term jihad but 
dismissed them. For HTI the meaning of jiha >d is equivalent with war, 
so the meaning of the word jiha>d as earnest activity, working hard or 
studying hard, should not be accorded any importance. It is evident 
also in the official website of HTI that the explicit, true meaning of 
jiha>d is war and that other alternative meanings advanced by scholars 
should be rejected:  
“Various methods are then applied; either nuanced or crude; using 
arguments which misinterpret the Qur’an and insult and distort 
the facts. These efforts attempt to change the meaning of jiha>d, 
among others by saying jiha>d in Islam is defensive (to survive), not 
offensive. They also utilize scholars, purporting to be wise and 
pious to say, that the important thing is jihad against lust; this jiha>d 
is jiha>d akbar (great) compared to jiha>d in the sense of war. There 
are also efforts to expand the meaning of jiha>d to take on further 
meanings in language. There are also terms that were previously 
                                                                
27 Interview with Sobri Lubis, 2009. 
28 Muh. Amin Arqi Angga Yuni Mantara Tutut Chusniyah, “Menjadi Kelompok 
Minoritas Dalam Mayoritas; Persepsi Ancaman, Orientasi Dominasi Sosial, Dan 
Intoleransi Terhadap Jamaah Ahmadiyah,” in International Conference on Islam and 
Civilizations (2019), 205–211. 
29 Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 2009. 
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unknown in the time of Muhammad and the Salaf al-sha>lih}, such as 
construction jihad, or political jihad, economic jihad, education 
jiha>d, and others. All this boils down to reducing the significance 
of the real sense of jiha>d, that of war”.30 
Sociocultural Practice 
It should be noted that the meaning of the term jiha >d has long been 
debated, and no single sense of the word has been agreed upon. For 
example, the Arabic word jiha>d jahada (abstract noun, juhd) means to try 
with all one’s might, or all one’s heart.31 In the early history of 
Muslims jiha>d in the sense of a physical war, occurred when Muslims 
fought against the people of Mecca in the Badr Kubra event.32 When 
examined further, the physical jiha>d of the Prophet and his companions 
during the events of Badr referred to jiha>d in the sense of war but it 
was a defensive action in order to maintain the continuity of the 
Muslim community in Medina which at that time was still a limited, 
nascent community. The spirit of jiha>d therefore aims not to 
undermine but rather to defend religious freedom. Although the FPI 
and HTI, recognise and apply different meanings of jiha >d, they both 
assert that the word cannot be separated from the context of Islam, 
and its meaning is derived from the Qur’an and Hadith. 
In the case of the 2016/7 movement to overthrow the former-
Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaha Purnama, alias Ahok, both FPI 
and HTI utilized the term jiha>d in their calls for action at that time. 
Various media also repeated the use of the term in their reporting. One 
news outlet even quoted the FPI’s East Sumatera chairperson, Habib 
Mahdi, who clearly used the word jiha >d to oppose Ahok: 
“The police do not fool the citizens. Ahok is insulting Islam. 
Beware the police about religious insults. Muslims are ready for 
jiha>d in Jakarta. One word, we must fight Ahok. We love 
                                                                
30 Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Manifesto Hizbut Tahrir Untuk Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka al-
Izzah, 2009). 
31 M. Khadduri, Perang Dan Damai Dalam Islam (Yogyakarta: Tarawang Press, 2002). 
32 Karen Amstrong, Berperang Demi Tuhan (Bandung: Mizan, 1994). 
 
 299 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 14, Number 02, December 2020 
Islamist Newspeak 
Indonesia, but if by Ahok’s behaviour it has gone too far. Don’t 
mess with Muslims.”33  
The use of the term jiha>d in this context, reflects the FPI’s 
preferred emphasis on the ‘conflict or war’ interpretation to the 
exclusion of the other broader meanings, as discussed above. The true 
broad meaning of the term has thus been significantly narrowed in this 
political discourse.  
2. Term of Khila >fah 
Text 
The word khila>fah is not found in the KBBI. However, khali >fah is 
defined as follows: 
Khali>fah n 1. The representative (successor) of the Prophet 
Muhammad after the Prophet's death (first in matters of state and 
religion) that implements Islamic law in national life; 2. (title) the 
religious head or king in Islamic countries; 3. ruler; manager of 
human beings created by God on the face of the earth.34 
Discourse Practice 
Whereas the word khali >fah is included in the KBBI and aligns with 
the concept of caliph or religious ruler, the word khila>fah which aligns 
with the concept of a caliphate, a religious state which will be 
established and will lead the world towards the implementation of 
complete Islamic law, is not included in the KBBI. It is therefore not a 
concept which is recognised in the Indonesian lexicon. However, HTI 
has continued to disseminate and reinforce the concept of the khila >fah 
as a central tenet of its ideological discourse, as well as the idea that 
when the Islamic khila>fah arrives, all the problems experienced by 
Muslims around the world will be resolved. HTI has strenuously 
advocated the concept of the khila >fah to Indonesian society, arguing 
that there are Qur’anic sources for it, however, a check of the Qur’an 
for the term khila>fah reveals that it does not appear in the text.  
                                                                
33 “Aksi Serentak Dari DKI Hingga Daerah Kecam Ahok Soal Surah Al Maidah | 





Lestari Nurhajati and Adam James Fenton 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 14, Number 02, December 2020 
300 
HTI, through the communications of its activists and cadres, 
explicitly advocates that the Indonesian government is now included in 
the category of kufr, and should be replaced by the Khila>fah Isla>miyah. 
This is consistent with results of previous studies which emphasize the 
specific efforts of HTI to enforce the khila>fah Isla>miyah.35 In various 
reports and books, HTI insists that the concept of khila>fah Isla >miyah 
cannot be separated from the meaning contained in the Qur’an and 
Hadith. It is also described in detail in the book Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia,36 which includes two verses of the Qur’an that are used to 
support the establishment of the khila>fah; Al-Maidah (5): 48 and 49 
which state:  
“So judge between them by what Allah has revealed and do not 
follow their inclinations away from what has come to you of the 
truth. To each of you We prescribed a law and a method. Had 
Allah willed, He would have made you one nation [united in 
religion], but [He intended] to test you in what He has given you; 
so race to [all that is] good. To Allah is your return all together, 
and He will [then] inform you concerning that over which you 
used to differ”.37 
HTI claim that these verses support the idea of a mandatory 
establishment of a caliphate, however the word khila >fah or caliphate 
clearly does not appear there, and there are no further Qur’anic or 
Hadith instructions or explanation on the issue.  
FPI’s understanding and use of the term khila >fah is different from 
HTI, however it appears to be moving closer to the HTI usage. 
Previously, FPI leadership espoused an understanding which aligned 
solely with Islamic leadership; the rule of the khila>fah, the leader, or 
Ima>mah—the concept that as in the days of the Prophet Muhammad 
and his Companions, the leadership should be held by one priest—the 
equivalent of a Pope—called the khila>fah. As such, FPI formerly 
eschewed the establishment of a global caliphate. However, under the 
leadership of Habib Rizieq the position has moved to align more with 
                                                                
35 Mubarak, Genealogi Islam Radikal Di Indonesia, Gerakan, Pemikiran Dan Prospek 
Demokrasi. 
36 Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Struktur Negara Khilafah: Pemerintah Dan Administrasi 
(Jakarta: HTI Press, 2005). 
37 Ibid. 
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HTI and the mandatory establishment of a caliphate. With regard to 
the meaning of the word khila >fah, FPI’s then-Secretary General Sobri 
Lubis revealed:  
“So when we refer to the khilafah, as one who must be obeyed and 
he had a task so heavy so he was obeyed, then terms with the loss 
of the khila>fah, for example in Turkish, Ottoman Dawlah time was 
lost, then stop of regeneration, we no longer have a priest. 
Nowadays with the loss of the leadership, we were like orphans. 
No father who protects, no loving mother, we were all eaten by 
non-Muslim groups which resulted in the emergence of new 
expectations championed of hope is the reappearance of the 
khila>fah, the enforcement of the khila>fah. FPI agrees, it is part of 
the khila>fah religious duty. Just might stay context yes, what kind, 
not like say by Hizb, not like that, we are not in the context of it. 
So it is not the same in terms of technical thinking”.38  
Although they have differing points of view, on the meaning of the 
khila >fah, HTI and FPI have the same view, that it was an integral part 
of the Qur’an and Hadith. 
Sociocultural Practice 
The use of the term khila>fah was used by HTI openly and 
vigorously in every demonstration where they opposed Ahok. As 
reported in a news report from the time, HTI in Mojokerto, East Java, 
also gave an anti Ahok speech with the theme of khila>fah:  
“Dozens of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) activists in Mojokerto 
also held a demonstration at a number of points in Mojokerto 
City, East Java, on Friday, December 2, 2016. In addition to 
voicing demands for charges of blasphemy against the incumbent 
DKI Jakarta Governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama alias Ahok, HTI 
raised the issue of khila>fah or leadership according to Islamic law, 
which HTI has been dreaming of. HTI activists gave speeches in 
                                                                
38 “FPI Tolak Tuduhan Dirikan Negara Khilafah, Ahmad Sobri Lubis Angkat Bicara 
Jelaskan Soal Khilafah”, Tribunnews.com, 4 December 2019. Retrieved from: 
https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2019/12/04/fpi-tolak-tuduhan-dirikan-nega-
ra-khilafah-ahmad-sobri-lubis-angkat-bicara-jelaskan-soal-khilafah.   
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four locations ... They also held banners reading “Sharia and the 
Khilafah: Maintaining the Glory of Islam and National Unity”.39  
The example is indicative HTI’s efforts to insert a distorted 
concept of khila >fah into the public discourse. In line with their political 
goals, the anti-Ahok demonstrations were a prime opportunity to push 
this agenda, that is the concept of an Indonesian Islamic state or 
khila >fah Isla >miyah.  
3. Term of H}abi>b 
Text 
The KBBI defines the word h}abi >b as follows: 
H}abi >b n 1. a loved one; lover; 2. The call to the Arabs, which 
means lord; a call to the person who holds Sayyid.40 
Discourse Practice 
For the FPI, h}abi >b is a term reserved for the descendants of the 
prophet Muhammad, and differs markedly from the general dictionary 
definition given above. It indicates very special status for those that 
claim it, especially within certain religious communities. According to 
current leader of FPI, Sobri Lubis:  
“The descendants of the prophet in Indonesia are known as 
Habib; in other places they are known as ‘Sayyid’, or ‘Syarif’. For 
this they are special. Why like this, because it is associated with 
Islam, which is associated with them. They have special rights set 
out in this religion, so as to keep them from extinction. By 
maintaining this tradition, we ensure the effectiveness of Islamic 
law”.41  
Further, according to Lubis, the term Habib is part of Islamic law 
(sharia). As a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad special privileges 
are set forth in the Qur'an and Sunnah:  
                                                                
39 “Ikut Demo 212, Hizbut Tahrir Mojokerto Usung Isu Khilafah  - Nasional 
Tempo.Co,” accessed April 24, 2020, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/824989/ikut-
demo-212-hizbut-tahrir-mojokerto-usung-isu-khilafah. 
40 https://kbbi.kemdikbud.go.id/entri/habib.  
41 Interview with Sobri Lubis, 2009.  
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“For example, in war, they are entitled to a greater share of the 
spoils of war. As the family of the Prophet, they are entitled to 
25%”.42  
Attitudes and statements of various members of the FPI board 
indicate that the usage of titles such as Habib within the group are of 
great significance. When asked whether then-leader Habib Rizieq had 
taken offense when his name was mentioned in a variety of media 
without using the title ‘h}abi >b’, Sobri insisted:  
“I never saw Habib Rizieq offended, because the media didn’t use 
the title ‘Habib’ but the students definitely did get offended, yes. 
For example, if the president was referred to with just his first 
name, how would we feel? Or for myself, as a cleric or ‘Ustad’ if I 
am not referred to as ‘Ustad’ probably my students would be 
offended if someone just referred to me as Sobri. My teachers 
taught me to always use such titles appropriately”.43  
So strong is the cult-like dependence of FPI members on the 
concept of the title ‘Habib’ as a descendant of the prophet, that much 
of the leader’s influence is derived from its usage. This was especially 
evident in the case of Habib Rizieq. Rosadi showed that the identity of 
the group was strongly linked to the identity of Habib Rizieq,44 as if 
the life or death of FPI was dependent on the presence of Habib 
Rizieq. 
Meanwhile HTI see the meaning of the word ‘Habib’ merely as a 
symbolic title or term which refers only to religious scholars and has 
no connection with claimed ancestry from the Prophet. When asked 
whether the significance of the title should be promoted or increased 
further, HTI spokesman Ismail Yusanto replied:  
“No, this is not necessary, because the term does not exist in the 
Prophet's guidance (Sunnah); it does not state that the title Habib 
should be used. Sorry to say. It should be clarified if it is part of 
the culture or Islamic law, Syar'i”.45  
                                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Rosadi Andriani, Hitam Putih FPI: Mengungkap Rahasia-Rahasia Mencengangkan Ormas 
Keagamaan Paling Kontroversial (Jakarta: Nun Publisher, 2008). 
45 Ismail Yusanto, Interview, 2009. 
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According to HTI, the usage of the term h}abi >b is therefore cultural, 
rather than based on religious scripture. So, an important distinction 
emerges in the usage of the term by these two groups, which is that for 
FPI “h}abi >b” derives from the Qur’an, whereas for HTI the usage of the 
term is merely linguistic.  
Sociocultural Context 
FPI’s interpretation of the term h}abi >b led to significant public 
debate about the true meaning of the term in Indonesian media. One 
example is a Kumparan news report from early 2017, titled: “Those 
Who Deserve to be called Habib”. The media interviewed Habib 
Ahmad Muhammad, an expert genealogist of the descendants of the 
prophet Muhammad in Indonesia. In his response he stressed that not 
everyone has the right to hold the title Habib. Although he did not 
directly discuss Habib Rizieq, he stated emphatically that someone 
with the title of Habib is subject to extra moral burdens and duties 
than regular people: “If someone with title of Habib commits a crime, 
we will usually go, question, then help him. If you do damage, it's very 
dangerous. The scholars say that his sins can multiply”.46 
In January 2017, Tirto.id news portal published a story titled “Many 
Habibs That Don't Reflect Good Morals”. While the article questions 
whether there is a family relationship between the interviewee Quraish 
Shihab and FPI leader Habib Rizieq, Quraish Shihab when questioned 
about the term Habib, replied “Habib is a person who loves and is 
loved. So “love” in Arabic means “muh}i >b”. The “beloved” are 
“mah }bu >b”. “Habib”… therefore cannot just want to be loved but not 
love others, it must be two-way”.47 This interpretation recognizes that 
the usage of the term Habib is not dependent on genealogy, rather an 
attitude of love to others. Such an interpretation is contrary to the 
exclusive construction preferred by FPI.  
The media reports quoted above show a clear tendency to interpret 
Arabic terminology such as h}abi>b in ways that are advantageous to the 
                                                                
46 “Mereka Yang Layak Disebut Habib - Kumparan.Com,” accessed April 24, 2020, 
https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/mereka-yang-layak-disebut-habib. 
47 “‘Banyak Habib Yang Tidak Mencerminkan Akhlak Yang Baik’ - Tirto.ID,” accessed 
April 24, 2020, https://tirto.id/banyak-habib-yang-tidak-mencerminkan-akhlak-yang-
baik-chxg. 
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personal and political interests of the groups and individuals in 
question. 
Table. Summary of Results of Analysis of Arabic Terms By FPI and HTI 
Level Analysis Result Analysis 
Text Based on in-depth interviews, each group has very different 
interpretations of the Arabic terms jiha>d, khila>fah and h}abi>b. 
Both groups claim textual rather than contextual meanings 
of each of the terms, derived from the Qur’an and Hadith. 




HTI and FPI have produced their own meaning of each of 
the terms (jiha>d, khila>fah and h}abi>b) to promote their own 
varying versions of Islam and employ the terminology to 
support their goals. The general public as the consumers of 
the text are encouraged to accept the definitions offered by 
the two organisations.  
Sociocultural 
Practice 
Although in the wider community the terms jiha >d, khila>fah 
and h}abi>b, have other meanings, as seen in the literature, 
these two groups (FPI and HTI), still interpret them 
according to the interests of their group. Then, this 
discourse is disseminated to the general public through 
propaganda, lectures, studies, and so on within the 
framework of their interpretation of Islam. 
 
Conclusion 
Differences in interpretation of the Arabic terms by these religious 
groups, reflect the interests of each group, to establish the meaning 
and form a collective meaning related to their interests. Although 
grammatically it cannot be denied that some Arabic terms has long 
been a part of the Indonesian words, the spread of new Arabic 
terminology over approximately the last two decades has been more 
intense. 
The term jiha>d is interpreted very differently by FPI and HTI. FPI 
interpret it more broadly, however HTI emphasize jiha>d as physical 
war. Meanwhile, although the term khila >fah is not found in the Qur’an 
or Hadith, HTI confirmed that this term is part of the heritage of the 
Qur’an and Hadith, because the khila >fah is a fundamental part of HTI’s 
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objectives, namely establishing Khila >fah Isla >miyah. Instead, the FPI does 
not consider the establishment of khila>fah as part of the Qur’an and 
Hadith, since the establishment of the khila>fah is not part of the 
purpose of the FPI. At the time of the research, the FPI did not 
support the idea of khila>fah, however that position may be changing. 
The term H }abi>b is crucial to the FPI group and plays a central role in 
the identity of it and its leader. It is believed to derive from the 
heritage of the Qur’an and Hadith, because Habib are the literal 
descendants of the Prophet. But for the HTI the term Habib is not 
part of the heritage of the Qur’an, but rather Arabic tradition. 
While their interpretations of particular terms may be different, 
both groups utilise Arabic terminology in their own way with a similar 
ideological end in mind, that is, that Islam is the only solution for all of 
humanity’s ills (al-Isla>m huwa al-h }all). There remains a common thread 
which links the prolific usage of Arabic terminology by these groups 
which is a narrative that Arabic is the language of Islam, and that its 
mastery indicates superior knowledge and piety which creates greater 
power in the hands of the users of the language to influence the 
thinking of the wider community.[] 
References 
Amstrong, Karen. Berperang Demi Tuhan. Bandung: Mizan, 1994. 
Anderbeck, Karl. “Portraits of Language Vitality in the Languages of 
Indonesia.” In Language Documentation and Cultural Practices in the 
Austronesian World, edited by I Wayan Arka, 19–47. Canberra: 
Asia-Pacific Linguistics, 2015. 
Anderson, Bennedict. Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in 
Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. 
Andriani, Rosadi. Hitam Putih FPI: Mengungkap Rahasia-Rahasia 
Mencengangkan Ormas Keagamaan Paling Kontroversial. Jakarta: Nun 
Publisher, 2008. 
Bocock, Robert. Pengantar Komperhensif Untuk Memahami Hegemoni. 
Yogyakarta: Penerbit Jalasutra, 2007. 
Chilton, Paul. Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice. London 
and New York: Routledge, 2004. 
Fairclough, Norman. Critical Discourse Analysis, The Critical Study of 
 
 307 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 14, Number 02, December 2020 
Islamist Newspeak 
Language. New York: Longman Group Limited, 1995. 
Gammon, Liam. “Is Populism a Threat to Indonesian Democracy?” In 
Democracy in Indonesia: Stagnation in Regression?, edited by Thomas 
Power and Eve Warburton. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2020. 
Habermas, Jurgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Reason and 
Rationalization of Society. Boston: Beacon Press Book, 1984. 
Hilmy, Masdar. Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism. 
Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010. 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. Manifesto Hizbut Tahrir Untuk Indonesia. 




Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. Struktur Negara Khilafah: Pemerintah Dan 
Administrasi. Jakarta: HTI Press, 2005. 
Khadduri, M. Perang Dan Damai Dalam Islam. Yogyakarta: Tarawang 
Press, 2002. 
Mubarak, M. Zaki. Genealogi Islam Radikal Di Indonesia, Gerakan, 
Pemikiran Dan Prospek Demokrasi. Jakarta: LP3ES, 2008. 
Nafis, Muhammad Wahyuni. Rekonstruksi Dan Renungan Religius Islam. 
Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996. 
Nimmo, Dan. Komunikasi Politik. Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2005. 
Orwell, George. 1984. New York: LeBook Publishing, 2020. 
Tutut Chusniyah, Muh. Amin Arqi Angga Yuni Mantara. “Menjadi 
Kelompok Minoritas Dalam Mayoritas; Persepsi Ancaman, 
Orientasi Dominasi Sosial, Dan Intoleransi Terhadap Jamaah 
Ahmadiyah.” In International Conference on Islam and Civilizations, 
205–211, 2019.  
Wahid, Abdurrahman. Ilusi Negara Islam, Ekspansi Gerakan Islam 
Transnasional Di Indonesia. Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2009. 
“A Kinder, More Gentle FPI? - Inside Indonesia.” Accessed May 11, 
2020. https://www.insideindonesia.org/a-kinder-more-gentle-
fpi. 
“Aksi Serentak Dari DKI Hingga Daerah Kecam Ahok Soal Surah Al 
 
 
Lestari Nurhajati and Adam James Fenton 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 14, Number 02, December 2020 
308 
Maidah.” Accessed April 24, 2020. https://www.merdeka.-
com/peristiwa/aksi-serentak-dari-dki-hingga-daerah-kecam-
ahok-soal-surah-al-maidah.html#. 
“‘Banyak Habib Yang Tidak Mencerminkan Akhlak Yang Baik’ - 
Tirto.ID.” Accessed April 24, 2020. https://tirto.id/banyak-
habib-yang-tidak-mencerminkan-akhlak-yang-baik-chxg. 
“Ikut Demo 212, Hizbut Tahrir Mojokerto Usung Isu Khilafah   - 
Nasional Tempo.Co.” Accessed April 24, 2020. https://nasi-
onal.tempo.co/read/824989/ikut-demo-212-hizbut-tahrir-
mojokerto-usung-isu-khilafah. 
“Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia | Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute | ASPI.” Accessed April 24, 2020. 
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/local-jihad-radical-islam-and-
terrorism-indonesia. 
“Mereka Yang Layak Disebut Habib - Kumparan.Com.” Accessed 
April 24, 2020. https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/mereka-
yang-layak-disebut-habib. 
“Reflections on a Reunion in Jakarta - New Mandala.” Accessed May 
11, 2019. https://www.newmandala.org/reflections-reunion/. 
Interviews 
Interview with Sobri Lubis, 2009. 
Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 2009. 
 
